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Trading on Short-Term Information
by
ALEXANDER GÜMBEL∗
This paper shows that investors may want fund managers to acquire and trade
on short-term instead of more profitable long-term information. This improves
learning about managerial ability from performance observations, for two rea-
sons. Firstly, short-term information is of higher quality, which allows the investor
to draw sharper inferences over a manager’s type. Secondly, performance obser-
vations under long-term informed trade are contaminated by noise contained in
prices, which further weakens inference. The paper thus explicitly links the de-
gree of short-term information dissemination to the profitability and the learning
implications of short-term versus long-term informed trading. (JEL: D 82, D 83,
G 14, G 23)
1 Introduction
There has been considerable debate, among economists and practitioners alike,
concerning short-termism in financial markets. Short-termism refers to factors con-
cerning the near future, like short-term profits and cash flows, carrying excessive
weight in decision-making compared to factors regarding the longer term. Excessive
is here defined relative to a first-best benchmark prevailing in a frictionless economy.
Short-termism among fund managers frequently is held responsible for undervalu-
ation of and therefore underinvestment in assets with long-horizon cash flows. In
turn, short-termist economies are alleged to suffer unnecessarily low growth rates
(MARSH [1990]).1
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eree for helpful comments. I would also like to thank participants at the WFA 1999
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1 DOW AND GORTON [1994] and ALLEN, MORRIS, AND SHIN [2004] provide a for-
mal treatment of why prices may not reflect long-term information effectively when
traders have short horizons. GÜMBEL [2005] explores the welfare implications of such
a failure. Note also that short-termism may arise in the absence of agency problems,
for example due to risk aversion (HOLDEN AND SUBRAHMANYAM [1996]).
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SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1997] argue that fund managers forgo long-term ar-
bitrage opportunities if investors remove funds from them after poor performance.
When stock prices are noisy, poor interim performance is a risk inherent in long-term
arbitrage, which managers will therefore seek to avoid. An interesting question is
then what the investors’ optimal behaviour in such a setting should be. While a num-
ber of papers have investigated optimal-contracting issues in delegated portfolio
management (see BHATTACHARYA AND PFLEIDERER [1985], STOUGHTON [1993],
HEINKEL AND STOUGHTON [1994]) and how contracts affect trading strategies (e.g.,
ALLEN AND GORTON [1993], DOW AND GORTON [1997], DASGUPTA AND PRAT
[2003]), it remains an open issue how contracting between the investor and the fund
manager affects the information horizon of trading strategies.
I show that an investor may prefer trade on short-term information by the manager,
because this allows her to learn more quickly about the manager’s unknown ability.
This comes at the cost of smaller expected trading profits from acquiring short-term
information. The basic idea is captured in a setting where a high-ability manager
sometimes learns that an asset is over- or undervalued from a private signal indicating
that a future dividend payment will be higher or lower than expected by the market.
Low-type managers never spot misvaluations. The investor can choose whether
she wants a manager of unknown ability to acquire information about a dividend
payment that is expected in the long term (two periods ahead) or in the short term
(one period ahead). Moreover, I assume that it is easier to predict the short-term
future and therefore a high-type manager is more likely to identify a short-term than
a long-term misvaluation.
In my model, acquiring the higher-quality short-term signal may be less profitable
for two reasons. Firstly, a manager who identifies a long-term misvaluation has
two trading dates available before the dividend payment actually occurs. He can
therefore profit from his private information twice, compared to only once when he
acquires short-term information. Secondly, I assume that short-term information is
partially disseminated into the price, because there is another short-term speculator
who sometimes identifies short-term misvaluations. A short-term informed manager
then competes in the financial market with this speculator, which reduces the rent
from trade on private information.
On the other hand, the investor learns more quickly about the manager’s ability
when he acquires short-term information, because it is inherently of higher quality
than long-term information. High-type managers are less likely to miss an arbitrage
opportunity when they try to identify short-term than long-term misvaluations.
This then makes it easier for the investor to identify a high-type manager when
he acquires short-term information. Performance observations generated from the
acquisition of the higher-quality short-term signal essentially allow sharper infer-
ences about the manager’s ability than the inferences drawn from trade on long-term
information.
Existing literature on short-termism has largely focused on the problem of invest-
ment decisions by firm managers (VON THADDEN [1995], SHLEIFER AND VISHNY
[1990], STEIN [1989]). These papers show that short-termism may be the result of
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the agency problem between the firm and its manager. Instead I show that short-
termist behaviour may prevail in the absence of a moral-hazard problem over the
choice of horizon. In a related paper VON THADDEN [1995] shows that short-term
investment projects may be desirable, because they provide better interim informa-
tion about project quality. This insight does not carry across to the fund-management
context in a straightforward manner, because interim performance information from
a long-horizon trading strategy may be available even in the short run. As DEMIRAG
[1995, pp. 43f.] points out:
“It is ... reasonable to argue that pressures to maximise short-run returns ... are in principle
compatible with a willingness to ignore short-term cash flows, profits, and dividends in
favour of long-term prospects. A fund manager who consistently recognized such prospects
and invested accordingly, shortly before others did, would ‘perform’ extremely well in the
short-term.”
I model explicitly a setup where managers who acquire long-term information may
perform well in the short run, because prices sometimes reflect future misvaluations
before they are realized. Nevertheless, short-term information acquisition may be
preferred by the investor, because it confers a learning advantage about managerial
ability on her.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
model of privately informed trade, and section 3 provides its solution. In section 4
the investor’s full optimization problem is presented, and its solution is derived in
section 5. Section 6 discusses robustness in the presence of moral hazard. Section 7
concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 The Model
The economy is in discrete time t = 0, 1, ...,∞. There are dividend-paying assets,
and for simplicity each asset has exactly one date at which it may pay an uncertain
dividend dt ∈ {−1,0, 1} with probabilities 1/4, 1/2, and 1/4, respectively. Assume
also that at each date there is exactly one asset for which that date is the payout date,
i.e., an asset is uniquely defined by the date t at which its dividend is due. I refer to
the asset for which date t is the dividend payout date simply as asset t. There is also
a risk-free asset with return r.
An infinite-lived investor can employ a fund manager to engage in active portfolio
management. The manager can acquire a private signal about the future dividend
payment, which is then used for trading decisions. There are two types of managers
m ∈ {L, H}, and only the high-type manager may receive an informative signal.
Neither the investor nor the managers can observe a manager’s type. There are
infinitely many managers, and a fraction γ0 of them are high types m = H. In
order to simplify the analysis of the learning problem I assume that there is no
agency problem between the investor and the fund manager. Section 6 provides
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a discussion of robustness when an agency problem between investor and fund
manager exists.
2.1 Information Structure
At any given date t a manager can produce either short-term information about the
dividend payment next period (dt+1) or long-term information about the dividend
payment two periods from now (dt+2). He then receives a signal st+htt ∈ {−1,0, 1},
where ht = 1 (ht = 2) indicates that short-term (long-term) information is acquired.
For expositional purposes assume that the signal is always zero when no information
is acquired, i.e., st+1t = 0 if ht = 2 and st+2t = 0 if ht = 1.
The signal quality differs between high- and low-type managers. Assume that low
types only ever receive the signal st+htt = 0. High-type managers on the other hand
receive a signal st+htt = 0 whenever the dividend payment is equal to its mean value
of zero, i.e., prob(st+htt = 0|dt+ht = 0) = 1. When the dividend payment is nonzero,
high types can learn this in advance with probability νs for short-term and νl for
long-term information, i.e.,
νs ≡ prob
(
st+1t = 1|dt+1 = 1
) = prob(st+1t = −1|dt+1 = −1) and
νl ≡ prob
(
st+2t = 1|dt+2 = 1
) = prob(st+2t = −1|dt+2 = −1),
respectively. Moreover, with complementary probability 1 − νs (or 1 − νl) a high type
receives the zero signal st+htt = 0, i.e., he never observes st+htt = −1 when dt+ht = 1
and vice versa. Hence, 1 − νs = prob(st+1t = 0|dt+1 = 1) = prob(st+1t = 0|dt+1 = −1),
and similarly for the long-term signal. Moreover, assume that it is easier to predict
the near-term future than the longer-term future, i.e., νs > νl .
In line with the assumption that there are no agency problems between managers
and the investor, one could think of the manager purely as a signal generator, whose
output is directly observable by the investor. The investor can then use the signals
to trade in the financial market.
Moreover, there is one short-term speculator for each asset. A short-term specu-
lator for asset t + 1 receives private (short-term) information at the previous date.
His signal st+1t has the same structure as a high-type fund manager’s, except that the
probability of receiving a signal indicating a nonzero dividend is captured by the
parameter β ≡ prob(st+1t = 1|dt+1 = 1) = prob(st+1t = −1|dt+1 = −1).
The short-term speculator serves two purposes. Firstly, his presence renders trade
on short-term information less profitable than trade on long-term information, be-
cause the investor loses her information monopoly. Secondly, prices become more
informative as time goes by. In particular, they may reflect information about a div-
idend payment one period before it is due. The investor can therefore evaluate the
manager after one period, even when he acquired (long-term) information regarding
the dividend payment two periods ahead. The degree to which the price allows the
investor to make an inference about the manager’s ability depends on its informa-
tiveness, which is increasing in the short-term speculator’s quality of information,
as measured by β.
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2.2 The Financial Market
There are four types of potential traders in each asset: The investor, a noise trader,
a short-term speculator, and a market maker. Trade and price formation are modelled
in a setup based on KYLE [1985]. All agents wishing to trade at a given date submit
their (market) orders simultaneously to the risk-neutral market maker, who sets the
price and balances order flow out of his inventory.
Define qτt as the investor’s order at date t for asset τ , and similarly define qt+1t as
the short-term speculator’s order for asset t + 1. The noise trader’s date-t demand for
asset τ ∈ {t + 1, t + 2} is given by nτt ∈ {−1, 1}. Each realization of nτt is assumed
to be equally likely, and demand is uncorrelated across time and across assets.
For τ > t + 2 noise-trader demand is zero. It would be fairly straightforward to
endogenize noise-trader demand, for example by modelling it as resulting from
a hedging need (see SPIEGEL AND SUBRAHMANYAM [1992]). In order to focus the
analysis, however, noise-trader demand is treated as exogenous here.
At date t the following sequence of events occurs. First, the dividend payment dt
is made to the holders of asset t. Second, the short-term speculator for asset t + 1
receives his private signal st+1t , and the investor simultaneously receives a short-term
signal st+1t . Orders for short-term trades qt+1t , qt+1t , and nt+1t are then submitted to the
market maker for asset t + 1, who sets a price pt+1t and executes the orders. Finally,
the investor receives a signal st+2t , and orders for long-term trades qt+2t and nt+2t are
submitted to the market maker for asset t + 2, who sets a price pt+2t and executes the
orders.2 The investor and the short-term speculator can condition their date-t orders
on past public information (prices and dividend payments) and the private signal(s)
each received up to the date-t signals st+htt and st+1t , respectively. Remember that
at any date t, only one signal, st+1t or st+2t , may ever be nonzero, depending on the
information horizon ht .
The short-term speculator active in asset t + 1 submits his order so as to maximize
the expected present value of trading profits, conditional on his signal and past prices:
max
qt+1t
E
[
qt+1t
(
dt+1
1 + r − p
t+1
t
)
| st+1t , pt+1t−1
]
.
There is exactly one market maker for each asset. Suppose that the market maker
can observe each individual order submitted to him, but he does not observe who
submitted the order. The total order flow Qτt is therefore the set of nonzero orders
submitted at date t for asset τ .3 In case of long-term orders Qt+2t there are only two
possible traders: the noise trader and the investor. For short-term orders Qt+1t there is
also the short-term speculator, increasing the maximum number of orders to three.
2 The reason for introducing a short delay between short-term and long-term trades
is to allow the investor to change a manager at date t on the basis of date-t price
movements without losing out on a round of trade. This will only become relevant in
section 4 when the investor’s employment policy is analysed.
3 In KYLE [1985] the market maker observes the sum of individual orders, which
is more convenient when working with normal distributions. See DOW AND GORTON
[1997] for a treatment similar to ours.
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As in KYLE [1985], I construct an equilibrium with informationally efficient
prices. By this is meant that prices are equal to the expected discounted asset value
conditional on the market maker’s information at the time t of setting the price, i.e.,
pτt =
1
(1 + r)τ−t E [dτ |t] ,
where t is the market maker’s information set at date t. One way to derive the
efficiency condition from first principles would be to allow for Bertrand competition
between many market makers for order-flow execution. In KYLE [1985], and most
of the literature building on it, this extra step is removed from the analysis for
simplicity’s sake. Instead, equilibrium is constructed by replacing the corresponding
optimization problem of multiple market makers with the simple informational
efficiency condition for the price as above. For that reason, Kyle’s model is, in his
own words, “not quite a game theoretic one” (p. 1318).
In order to apply standard game-theoretic equilibrium concepts, it is necessary to
model the market makers as payoff-maximizing agents. I therefore choose a different
shortcut that achieves informationally efficient prices with fully endogenous market
maker behaviour, without having to add a full analysis of market maker competition.
In particular, assume that each market maker has a payoff function that is strictly
decreasing in his pricing error. This rewards him directly for setting informationally
efficient prices. The payoff function of the market maker for asset τ is given by
Mτ = −
2∑
t′=1
(
dτ
(1 + r)t′ − p
τ
τ−t′
)2
.
Note that the solution to maxpτ
τ−t′ E
[
Mτ |τ−t′
]
is given by
pτ
τ−t′ = E
[
dτ
(1 + r)t′ |τ−t′
]
,
which yields informationally efficient prices.4
Finally, assume that no side payments between the investor, the market maker, and
the short-term trader are possible. This is to rule out that the investor tries to collude
with the market maker and bribe him to set prices inefficiently at the expense of the
noise traders. Similarly, the assumption rules out that the investor colludes with the
short-term speculator to act as an information monopolist, again at the expense of
the noise traders.
3 Trading Strategies and Profits
This section considers the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the restricted
trading game described above. In this restricted game the investor’s only choice
variables at each date t are the orders qt+1t and qt+2t . She chooses orders so as to
maximize the expected present value of trading profits conditional on her signals
4 Note that this pricing strategy yields zero expected profits.
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st+1t , s
t+2
t , and st+1t−1 (signals about assets before t + 1 are irrelevant at date t, because
the dividend payment has already been made and no further trade occurs). Hence,
the restricted game examined in this section differs from the full game described
in section 4 by allowing for neither managerial hiring and firing decisions, nor the
choice of an information horizon.
The analysis of the restricted game serves to simplify the analysis of the full game
of sections 4 and 5. It also provides a comparison of trading profits from short-term
and long-term information acquisition. This yields a parameter restriction on when
long-term information acquisition is the first-best choice of information horizon.
This is obviously important, given that the main result of this paper will be to
show that short-term information acquisition may be chosen even when long-term
information acquisition is the first best.
Assume that it is common knowledge that γt > 0.
PROPOSITION 1 There exists a PBE of the trading game. The investor’s equilibrium
trading strategy for all t ≥ 0 is given by
qt+2t = st+2t ,(1)
qt+1t =
{
st+1t−1 if st+1t−1 = 0, t > 0,
st+1t otherwise,
(2)
and the equilibrium strategy of the short-term speculator active in asset t + 1 is
given by
qt+1t = st+1t .(3)
The investor’s trading strategy is straightforward: she buys after positive news, sells
after negative news, and does not trade after the zero signal. Moreover, if the investor
has received an informative long-term signal st+1t−1 = 0, then at t she trades again in
the same direction as before. If she has not received an informative long-term signal
at t − 1, she follows the date-t short-term signal. Similarly, the short-term speculator
buys (sells) after positive (negative) news and does not trade after the zero signal.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, the investor and the short-term speculator
sometimes trade at date t in asset t + 1 even though the date-t − 1 price fully revealed
private information (Qt+1t−1 ∈ {{−1,−1} , {1, 1}}). Such trades yield zero profits. There
exist other equilibria in which the investor and/or the short-term speculators do not
trade in this case. Note that both equilibrium prices and trading profits are unchanged
in these alternative equilibria. Outside of these trivially different equilibria, there is
no other equilibrium (see the proof of Proposition 2 for a formal treatment of this
issue).
Consider an investor who employs a fund manager who is a high type with
probability γt . We now calculate the total trading profits from (potentially repeated)
trade in one asset as a function of the information horizon ht . In the case of long-
term information (ht = 2) this means calculating the expected discounted profits
from trading qt+2t and qt+2t+1 according to the equilibrium in Proposition 1. In the case
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of short-term information (ht = 1), profits accrue from the trade qt+1t alone. For
short-term information acquisition consider the case where information about asset
t + 1 is acquired for the first time at date t. This may be different from repeated
acquisition of information, because expected trading profits would otherwise depend
on the previous date’s signal realization. Although it is straightforward to calculate
expected trading profits even then, it turns out not to be necessary: it is shown below
that acquiring short-term information after long-term information is never optimal.
PROPOSITION 2 The date-t present value of the investor’s expected trading profits
from long-term information acquisition at date t in any PBE of the trading game is
given by
E [π (γt, ht = 2)] = γtνl4 (1 + r)2
(
1 + 1 − β
2
)
.(4)
The date-t present value of the investor’s expected trading profits from first time
short-term information acquisition at date t in any PBE of the trading game is given
by
E [π (γt, ht = 1)] = γtνs (1 − β)4 (1 + r) .(5)
Even though there are multiple equilibria of the trading game, profits are uniquely
determined by (4) and (5). This is because the equilibria differ in a trivial way: at
some nodes players are indifferent between actions that yield zero payoffs. Hence,
trading profits are not affected across the possible equilibria.
Expected trading profits increase with the manager’s reputation γt and with the
quality νl or νs of a high-type manager’s signal, and they decrease with increasing
discount rate r and with increasing quality β of the short-term speculator’s infor-
mation. Acquiring the long-term signal and trading on it has two advantages over
using the short-term signal. Firstly, when the investor first trades on long-term in-
formation, she is the only trader endowed with this information. When she trades
on the short-term signal she competes with another potentially informed speculator,
which reduces her rent from trade on this information. Secondly, the investor has the
opportunity to trade on long-term information twice, viz., if the mispricing persists
after her first trade, she has a further arbitrage opportunity in the following period.
The expected profits in the second round of trade then are decreasing in β. However,
since β does not affect the profits of the first round of trade, profits from long-term
information acquisition are less sensitive to a change in β than those from short-term
information acquisition. Thus, there exists a value of β high enough that the expected
trading profits from acquiring long-term information exceed those from short-term
information. A simple comparison between (4) and (5) yields the following result:
COROLLARY 1 Acquiring long-term information is more profitable than acquiring
short-term information if
β ≥ νs (1 + r) −
3
2νl
νs (1 + r) − 12νl
.(6)
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During the remainder of the paper I focus on parameter values satisfying (6) and
νs > νl . Hence, I focus on a setting where short-term information is of higher
quality than long-term information, but trading profits from short-term information
are lower, because another speculator also trades on short-term information. The
more informed this other speculator is (the higher β), the less advantageous it is to
acquire short-term compared to long-term information.
Note also, that the condition (6) is independent of a manager’s reputation γt . By
assuming that (6) holds, it is therefore also assumed that long-term information
acquisition is optimal in the benchmark case where the manager’s type is known to
the investor.
We can apply the results of Proposition 2 and write the expected discounted
trading profits from one-off information acquisition ht as a function of the manager’s
reputation and the chosen information horizon as follows:
E[π(γ̂t, ht)] =

γ̂tνs(1−β)
4(1+r) if ht = 1,
γ̂tνl
4(1+r)2
(
1 + 1−β2
)
if ht = 2.
(7)
4 Learning from Performance Observations
This section completes the description of the full game. In addition to the trading
decision, the investor now chooses an employment policy and an information horizon
at each date. These decisions affect contemporaneous profits as well as the investor’s
ability to learn the manager’s type. Moreover, we need to consider more carefully
the investor’s payoffs, which in general are affected by trading profits and the wage
paid to the fund manager.
First, consider wage determination for the fund manager. If a manager is picked
from the pool, he has no bargaining power and receives the minimum wage of
zero from the investor. If a manager has been employed for at least one period
and established a better reputation, he may gain some bargaining power. Under the
assumption that a manager’s employment record is publicly observable and that
there are other investors who could hire the manager, he could extract the entire
surplus from an increased reputation by threatening to switch to a different investor.
It is assumed, however, that the manager has an element of investor-specific ability
that is nontransferable to other investors. A manager, for example, who has proven
himself at managing a portfolio of UK listed shares is not necessarily equally able to
manage an East Asia hedge fund. A fraction of the informational rent can therefore
be captured by the investor.
Assume therefore that a higher-reputation manager can capture a fraction α of
his trading profit. Assume that α is such that the manager and the investor are both
strictly better off from dealing with each other than from ending the relationship.
This assumption ensures that the investor has an interest in identifying a high-type
manager. Otherwise the investor would be indifferent between employing either type
of manager, and the employment policy would be irrelevant. Empirical evidence,
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however, suggests that investors react to past managerial performance by switching
between funds or laying off poorly performing managers (see CHEVALIER AND
ELLISON [1997], [1999]).
We can then write the expected discounted payoff to the investor from acquiring
information of horizon ht and trading according to (1) and (2), using (7), as
E[Π(γ̂t, ht)] =
{
E[π(ht, γ̂t)] if γ̂t ≤ γ0,
(1 − α) E[π(ht, γ̂t)] if γ̂t > γ0.
(8)
At date t the investor chooses an employment variable et ∈ {0,1}. She can choose
either to fire the incumbent manager and employ a new manager from the pool
(et = 0), or to retain the incumbent manager (et = 1). Simultaneously the investor
chooses an information horizon ht . She can do so after having observed the divi-
dend dt , or she can wait until after having observed the price pt+1t . This allows an
investor to observe the date-t performance of a manager who acquired long-term
information at date t − 1, by observing a price pt+1t that may reflect information
on dt+1. The investor can then fire the manager if she wishes to and hire a new
manager. Since by assumption (see section 3) the market for the long-term asset
t + 2 only meets with a short delay, the new manager can immediately generate
a further long-term signal on which the investor can trade at the same date t.5
The investor can then update her belief about the manager’s type by comparing
the manager’s date-t − 1 signal st−1+ht−1t−1 with the dividend realization and/or the re-
alized date-t price. Denote by γt the updated probability that the manager, employed
between dates t − 1 and t, is a high type, conditional on the date-t performance
observations. The relationship between reputation updates and performance obser-
vations is fully developed in sections 4 and 5. Moreover, denote by γ̂t the reputation
of the manager who is acquiring information at date t. If the incumbent manager is
retained, we have that γ̂t = γt . If he is fired and replaced by a new manager, we have
that γ̂t = γ0. To summarize:
γ̂t (γt, et) =
{
γt if et = 1,
γ0 if et = 0.
(9)
4.1 The Optimal Policy
The investor faces a dynamic optimization problem with choice variables et, ht
and qt+1t , qt+2t at each date t. The value function is the expected present discounted
value of all future payoffs. An equilibrium of the full game is now defined as
a PBE such that at each date, the investor chooses actions et, ht and qt+1t , qt+2t so as
to maximize her value function. Payoffs and choice variables of all other players
remain unchanged.
5 This assumption clearly increases the value of long-term information acquisition
due to learning about managerial ability. It therefore makes it harder to show the main
result that short-term may be preferred to long-term information acquisition.
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LEMMA 1 The equilibrium trading and price-setting strategies of the full game are
the same as those of the restricted trading game.
Lemma 1 says that the trading and price-setting strategies of the overall equilibrium
are simply given by the equilibrium strategies of the trading game.6 The intuition for
this is simple: the investor can separate the trading decision from the employment
and information-horizon decisions. She therefore continues to choose trades so as to
maximize expected trading profits contingent on the signal realizations. This allows
us to write the investor’s overall optimization problem in a much simpler form. In
particular, at each date we can use the expected payoff from choosing a particular
trading horizon as the instantaneous payoff at that date. Moreover, we can ignore the
choice of trades at each date, since we know how they are determined. We can then
reduce the investor’s optimization problem to a choice over information horizon and
employment policy at each date, where the instantaneous payoff from this choice is
given by the expected discounted payoff of the reduced-form game of trade in the
corresponding asset.
The investor’s immediate payoff in each of the trading games is uniquely given
by (8). The overall game can therefore be solved by solving the reduced-form game
in which a particular information horizon and employment variable directly generate
an expected payoff given by (8). This game features no further strategic interaction
and is a pure decision problem in which the investor chooses an information horizon
and an employment variable at each date.
The investor’s value function is the sum of all the expected payoffs given by (8).
This can be written as a function of two state variables.7 The first is the incumbent
manager’s reputation, denoted by γt . At the initial date this is simply the reputation
γ0 of a manager picked from the pool. The investor then uses the reputation γ̂t from
(9) and updates this prior after observing the manager’s performance at t + 1. This
yields a new reputation γt+1, which serves as the input into next period’s maximiza-
tion problem. The realization of γt+1 is stochastic and depends on the manager’s
actual performance. When a newly employed manager acquires short-term infor-
mation at date t, a performance observation at t + 1 consists of (st+1t , dt+1). Under
long-term information acquisition it consists of (st+2t , pt+2t+1). The transition function
mapping γ̂t into γt+1 thus depends on whether the manager acquired short-term
or long-term information. Details of this function are provided in the proofs of
Propositions 3 and 4, where the optimal policies are derived.
Moreover, the value function depends on a second state variable It ∈ {∅, {st+1t−1}},
which serves as a “memory” for the past signal. In some states of the world, the
variable γt does not fully describe the state of the dynamic system. It is then necessary
to introduce a further state variable that completes the description of the system’s
6 The multiplicity of equilibria in the trading game carries across to the overall
equilibrium. However, this does not matter, because payoffs are uniquely determined
across these equilibria, just as before.
7 The equilibrium strategies are therefore Markov. Note, however, that this is not
a restriction. It is the direct result of the simple structure of the problem.
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history. This variable essentially serves as a record of the last signal when long-term
information was acquired at the previous date. This is sometimes necessary, because
the investor can usually only fully evaluate the manager two dates after he acquired
long-term information. Suppose a manager acquires long-term information at t − 1.
The investor can evaluate this manager’s performance two periods later when the
dividend dt+1 is realized. Knowing only the manager’s reputation at date t is therefore
generally not sufficient in order to update the belief about the manager at t + 1. In
addition, the investor needs to remember the manager’s date-t − 1 signal, which is
recorded by It =
{
st+1t−1
}
.
There are, however, some states when the manager has acquired long-term infor-
mation at t − 1 that do allow a complete reputation update at date t. This happens
if the investor learns at date t the dividend realization dt+1 from the price pt+1t . In
that case she no longer needs to wait for the actual dividend realization in order to
complete the belief update. This only happens when the manager receives st+1t−1 = 0,
but the subsequent price reveals a nonzero dividend (pt+1t = 0). In this case we can
set It = ∅. In all other cases of long-term information acquisition, either (i) the
investor does not learn the dividend realization dt+1 at date t (when pt+1t = 0), or (ii)
the price pt+1t reveals dt+1 due to the investor’s own trade, which does not provide
an independent confirmation of the future dividend payment. In these cases we set
It = {st+1t−1}.
Finally, when the manager acquires short-term information at date t − 1, the per-
formance observation at date t is based on dt and therefore contains all information
necessary to perform a reputation update γt . We can then set It = ∅ whenever
the manager acquired short-term information at t − 1. Formally, It is determined
according to
It =
{
∅ if ht−1 = 1 or (ht−1 = 2 and st+1t−1 = 0, pt+1t = 0),{
st+1t−1
}
otherwise.
(10)
The investor then faces the following optimization problem:
V (γt, It) = max
et ,ht
{
E[Π (γ̂t, ht)] + 11 + r E [V (γt+1, It+1)]
}
,(11)
where the investor’s instantaneous payoff E[Π (γ̂t, ht)] can be calculated straight-
forwardly using (8) and (9), and V (γt+1, It+1) denotes the expected present value of
all future payoffs under the optimal policy. Once the investor learns that a manager
is a high type with probability one, learning stops and the optimal policy is to retain
that manager and let him acquire long-term information at all future dates [this
follows from the condition (6)].
REMARK 1 If the condition (6) holds, the optimal policy at (γt = 1, It) is eT = 1
and hT = 2 for all T ≥ t. The value function is then given by
V(1) ≡ V(γt = 1, It) = (1 − α) νl4r (1 + r)
(
1 + 1 − β
2
)
.(12)
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5 Short-Term versus Long-Term Information Acquisition
This section presents the main result on the optimal choice of information horizon
and employment policy. It proceeds in the following way. The state variables at
the beginning of the game are γ0,∅; i.e., the investor employs a manager from the
pool, and the memory for past signals is empty. Starting from this point, the investor
has the choice between short-term and long-term information acquisition. Firstly,
I derive the optimal policy for all possible later realizations of the state variables
starting from γ0,∅ under the assumption that the investor always chooses ht = 1
when the state (γ0,∅) occurs. I call this the short-term constrained optimal policy
with associated value Vs (γ0,∅) to the investor. The policy and its value are given in
Proposition 3. I then provide the corresponding long-term constrained optimal pol-
icy and value Vl (γ0,∅) under the alternative assumption that long-term information
acquisition is chosen in state (γ0,∅) (Proposition 4). It follows from the recursive
structure of the problem that if it is optimal to induce short-term (long-term) infor-
mation acquisition at any date when the state variable is γ0,∅, it will be optimal to do
so whenever the state variable is γ0,∅. The value function is therefore simply given
by V(γ0,∅) = max {Vs (γ0,∅) , Vl (γ0,∅)} . Note that the existence of an optimal
solution is trivial here, because the problem is sufficiently simple to identify uniquely
the optimal policy given that either ht = 1 or ht = 2 is chosen in state γ0,∅.
5.1 Short-Term Information Acquisition
PROPOSITION 3 Suppose the investor induces short-term information acquisition
(ht = 1) in state γt = γ0, It =∅. The investor’s short-term constrained optimal policy
is then contingent on performance observations (st+1t , dt+1) as follows:
et+1 = 1, ht+1 = 2 if st+1t = dt+1 ∈ {−1, 1},
et+1 = 1, ht+1 = 1 if st+1t = dt+1 = 0,
et+1 = 0, ht+1 = 1 otherwise.
(13)
The investor’s expected discounted payoff from this policy is given by
Vs (γ0,∅) = (1 + r) E[π (γ0, 1)] +
1
2γ0νsV(1)
r + 12γ0νs
.(14)
The short-term constrained optimal policy in this case takes a particularly simple
form, which can be summarized by
et = 1, ht = 2 if γt = 1, It = ∅,
et = 1, ht = 1 if γt = γ0, It = ∅,(15)
et = 0, ht = 1 if γt < γ0, It = ∅.
If a newly employed manager performs badly once (he receives a zero signal when
the dividend is nonzero), he is fired and replaced by a new manager from the pool.
The new manager will be asked to acquire short-term information. If the manager
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gets a zero signal and the dividend is zero, he is retained, but continues to trade on
short-term information. If the manager trades in the correct direction, he is retained
and asked to trade on long-term information. From Remark 1 we know that he
will continue to acquire long-term information ever thereafter. This then also gives
a complete description of an optimal policy under the assumption that a newly
employed manager acquires short-term information.
Note that the investor is indifferent between retaining and firing the manager after
the performance observation st+1t = dt+1 = 0. Therefore, there exists another policy
that yields the same payoff to the investor and in which a newly employed manager
is always fired unless he generates a nonzero signal.
5.2 Long-Term Information Acquisition
When the manager acquires long-term information, we need to distinguish the cases
(a) where he does so for the first time, and (b) where he does so repeatedly. In
principle one may also consider the case where a manager goes back and forth
between acquiring long-term and short-term information several times. However, as
shown below, it is never optimal to induce short-term information acquisition directly
after long-term information acquisition. Hence, whenever a manager acquires long-
term information, it is either because he does so for the first time, or because he
does so repeatedly without interruption. It follows that we need not consider the
case of inducing short-term information unless It = ∅, which is the case covered in
section 5.1.
LEMMA 2 If it is optimal to let a newly employed manager acquire long-term
information, it is never optimal to switch to short-term information acquisition at
a later date.
From Lemma 2 it follows that any policy for which long-term information acquisi-
tion is optimal in state (γ0,∅) is fully characterized by considering the employment
policy only. In the subsequent description the policy choice ht = 2 is omitted for
brevity.
PROPOSITION 4 Suppose the investor induces long-term information acquisition
(ht = 2) in state γt = γ0, It = ∅. The following employment decisions are then long-
term constrained optimal at date t + 1:
et+1 = 1 if st+2t ∈ {−1, 1},
et+1 = 0 otherwise.(16)
The investor’s payoff in this case is given by
Vl (γ0,∅) = (1 + r) E[π (γ0, 2)] +
1
2γ0νlV(1)
r + 12γ0νl
.(17)
Again the employment policy is straightforward. If the manager receives a nonzero
signal, he is retained, because only high types receive such a signal. From Remark 1
Alexander Gümbel442 JITE 161
we know that this manager will now always be retained and asked to acquire long-
term information. If the manager receives a zero signal, he is fired. The newly
employed manager then falls under the rules of Proposition 4, i.e., the state is
(γ0,∅), and he will acquire long-term information. A complete description of the
long-term constrained optimal policy is therefore given by
et = 1, ht = 2 if γt ≥ γ0, It ∈
{
∅,
{
st+1t−1
}}
,
(18)
et = 0, ht = 2 if γt < γ0, It ∈
{
∅,
{
st+1t−1
}}
.
We are now in a position to identify the set of parameters for which the investor
would prefer inducing short-term information acquisition with a newly employed
manager. Since V(γ0,∅) = max{Vs(γ0,∅), Vl(γ0,∅)}, short-term information acqui-
sition is preferred when (14) is larger than (17). It is also straightforward to show
that the intersection of the resulting parameter space with the restriction νs > νl
and (6) is nonempty. To see this most clearly, set β = 1, which implies that (6) is
satisfied, i.e., acquiring long-term information is first best. The comparison between
Vs (γ0,∅) and Vl (γ0,∅) then yields the following condition:
COROLLARY 2 Suppose β = 1. Then for
1
2 (1 − α) (νs − νl) − 12γ0νs > r(19)
the investor’s equilibrium choice of information horizon for a newly employed
manager is short-term.
If α is too large, the investor does not benefit sufficiently from identifying a high-
type manager to be willing to incur the cost of doing so. The cost consists of the
reduction in immediate trading profits that results from letting the manager acquire
the less profitable short-term signal. Similarly, if r is large, the investor’s opportunity
cost of time becomes so high that she is no longer willing to forgo current profits in
exchange for increased profits in the future. Finally, when γ0 is small it is particularly
costly to make the mistake of firing a high-type manager, because it is unlikely that
another high type will be picked at the next date. This mistake occurs less frequently
under short-term information acquisition.
Under either short-term or long-term information acquisition the investor learns
that a manager is a high type only when the manager receives a nonzero signal.
Since high types do not always receive a nonzero signal, they may go unrecognized
(i) when the zero signal is accurate (dt+ht = 0), or (ii) when they happen not to
learn that the future dividend is different from zero. The investor therefore makes
the mistake of rejecting high types relatively often. Moreover, it is harder under
long-term information acquisition to receive a signal that allows a manager to be
identified as a high type because νl < νs. It follows that high types are rejected more
frequently when long-term information is acquired. The investor may therefore
prefer the manager to acquire short-term information.
An important difference between long-term and short-term information acquisi-
tion is the desirability of firing a manager. Under short-term information acquisition
the investor strictly prefers to fire a manager only when he mistakenly receives the
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zero signal, i.e., when st+1t = 0, dt+1 ∈ {−1, 1}. Under long-term information acqui-
sition a manager is always fired when he does not trade. In particular, he is fired even
when the subsequent price stays at zero, which provides some confirmation that the
dividend payment is zero. The investor observes the price pt+2t+1 as a noisy indicator of
whether an arbitrage opportunity existed. When pt+2t+1 = 0 the investor does not know
whether this is an accurate reflection of the asset’s true value or whether it simply
indicates a failure of the market price to reflect the true value. Therefore the price
pt+2t+1 = 0 does not show conclusively to the investor whether her manager correctly
received a zero signal or instead was unable to identify an arbitrage opportunity.
Given this information, an observation of st+2t = 0 is more likely to originate from
a low type, and the manager’s reputation therefore falls below γ0. At this point it
is strictly optimal to fire him. Hence, noisy prices carry a cost to the manager who
acquires long-term information, because he faces a high likelihood of being fired.
And they carry a cost to the investor, because she finds it harder to identify high-type
managers as such.
6 Incentive Compatibility
So far it has been assumed that there is no agency problem between the investor
and the manager. This could be the case, for example, because the signal gener-
ated by the manager is hard information, i.e., the investor can verify it. In practice,
some fund managers employ algorithms for generating trading recommendations.
The hard information setup corresponds to the case where such a manager essen-
tially hands the algorithm over to the investor, who can verify the resulting trading
recommendations and choose the trades herself.
Suppose instead that the manager’s signal is soft, i.e., the investor cannot observe
the manager’s signal. In that case, the investor can learn from the manager’s trade
instead of the signal realization in much the same way, as long as he continues to
trade according to the profit-maximizing strategies (1) and (2).
Note that the manager does not have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
trading strategy if he receives a nonzero signal st+htt = 0: His identity (high type)
is immediately revealed to the investor by trading on the signal. This increases the
manager’s bargaining power and subsequent payoffs, so he clearly would not deviate.
The manager, however, may wish to deviate by trading after st+htt = 0. The potential
benefit from doing so stems from (i) being thought of as a high type immediately
and thereby increasing his bargaining power more quickly, and/or (ii) increasing his
probability of being retained. Suppose also that the manager has limited liability (or
no wealth), so that the agency problem cannot be resolved in a trivial way.8
When the manager acquires short-term information and receives a zero signal, his
likelihood of being retained in the next period is highest if he does not trade, because
prob(dt+1 = 0|st+1t = 0) > prob(dt+1 = 0|st+1t = 0). The only potential benefit from
8 With sufficient pledgeable wealth the investor could always impose a punishment
for deviation that would resolve the agency problem at zero cost.
Alexander Gümbel444 JITE 161
trading is therefore to be thought of as a high type immediately so as to increase his
bargaining power more quickly. Compare this with long-term information acqui-
sition, where the investor’s employment policy is particularly harsh: a manager is
fired unless he trades. The manager may therefore trade in order to increase his like-
lihood of being retained and in order to increase his bargaining power more quickly.
This increases his overall incentive to deviate, and implementing the desired trading
strategy becomes more costly under long-term information acquisition. The major
effect of introducing an agency problem would therefore be to shift the balance in
favour of short-term information acquisition.
This finding is consistent with VON THADDEN [1995], who shows that a long-term
project may not be incentive-compatible when outside financiers make continuation
of the firm contingent on short-term performance. In contrast to that, incentive
compatibility under short-term information acquisition in my model is easier to
satisfy, because the investor optimally applies a softer employment rule. This is
because of the poorer information available under long-term information acquisition
at the time of taking the decision to retain a manager.
Finally, the investor can reduce the cost of rendering the long-term trading strategy
(1) incentive-compatible, by applying a softer employment rule: She could commit
to retaining the manager if he does not trade and the subsequent price stays at zero.
Interestingly, the cost of this policy depends on the information content of the stock
price: If the quality of the short-term speculator’s information, β, is high, then the
stock price is more likely to reveal when a manager should have traded but failed
to do so. When β is low (prices are not very informative), the investor is less likely
to be able to detect such a failure, and this policy becomes too expensive. The
investor therefore switches back to a price-insensitive firing policy. This clarifies
the assumption made in SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1997] regarding investors’ fund-
switching behaviour in response to interim price movements. We would expect
investors to respond to interim performance observations only when prices may
be informative. Noise traders may affect interim performance, but the more noisy
prices become, the less sensitively one would expect investors to react to interim
performance observations.
7 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question why fund managers may display a bias towards
short-term information acquisition when it is more profitable to acquire and trade
on long-term information instead. It shows that such short-termism may be driven
by an investor’s desire to learn about the unknown ability of a fund manager. The
results are derived in a setting where the quality of the manager’s information
affects (i) the expected profits from trading on it, and (ii) the investor’s ability to
draw inferences about managerial ability from performance observations. When the
quality of short-term information is higher than that of long-term information, the
investor may prefer the former, since it allows her to draw sharper inferences about
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the manager’s ability. There is, however, a cost of learning, because short-term
information is already partially disseminated into the price, which reduces profits
from trading on it.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The investor’s optimal trading strategy in asset τ can be determined by maximizing
the expected discounted profit from trade in asset τ alone. This is because the
investor’s play in asset τ does not affect his own payoffs in other assets or the play
by the market makers or the short-term speculators in other assets. Therefore, the
trading strategy for each asset can be analyzed in isolation.
The following order flows may be observed by the market maker for asset t + 2
under the trading strategy (1):
Qt+2t = {1, 1}: The investor’s buy order is revealed; the market maker infers that
the dividend is high (dt+2 = 1) and sets pt+2t
(Qt+2t = (1, 1)) = P2.
Qt+2t ∈ {{1}, {−1}}: The market maker knows that the investor did not submit an
order, either because she received the signal st+2t = 0, or because she did not acquire
long-term information. Bayesian updating yields pt+2t = 0.
Qt+2t = {−1, 1}: The market maker knows that the investor submitted an order,
but he cannot tell whether it was a buy or a sell order. Bayesian updating yields
prob(dt+2 = 1|Qt+2t = {−1,1}) = 1/2. Similarly, prob(dt+2 = −1|Qt+2t = {−1,1}) =
1/2 and prob(dt+2 = 0|Qt+2t = {−1, 1}) = 0. The price is therefore
pt+2t
(Qt+2t = {−1, 1}) = 1
(1 + r)2
(
1 · 1
2
+ (−1) · 1
2
)
= 0.
Qt+2t = {−1,−1}: Order flow reveals the investor’s sell order, and the price fully
reflects this information: pt+2t
(Qt+2t = {−1,−1}) = −P2.
The market maker’s price-setting strategy, including off-the-path prices, is sum-
marized below:
pt+2t =

P2 if Qt+2t ∈ {{1,1}, {x,1}, {x,−1}}, x > 0, x = 1,
−P2 if Qt+2t ∈ {{−1,−1}, {x, 1}, {x,−1}}, x < 0, x = −1,
0 otherwise.
(A1)
For off-the-equilibrium-path observations Qt+2t ∈ {{x,1}, {x,−1}} where x /∈
{−1, 0, 1}, the market maker believes that a deviation x > 0 (x < 0) stems from
a positively (negatively) informed investor and sets P2 (−P2).
Now consider optimality of the strategy (1). If the investor has a signal st+2t ∈
{−1, 1}, she is clearly better off trading exactly −1, or 1, since in some states of the
world her order is not revealed and she can make a profit. If the signal is st+2t = 0,
it is optimal not to trade at all, because if the investor were to trade (say buy),
she would have to pay a high price pt+2t > 0 with positive probability (and never
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pt+2t < 0). Given that her best estimate of the value of the stock conditional on her
signal is zero, she would make a loss in expectation on such a trade.
Consider now order flow and prices for asset t + 1. Suppose that trade at date t − 1
did not reveal information, i.e., Qt+1t−1 ∈ {{1}, {−1}, {−1, 1}}. The price may move up
or down when subsequent order flow does reveal private information. Orders reveal
positive information when Qt+1t ∈ Q+ ≡ {{1, 1, 1}, {−1, 1, 1}, {1, 1}}, in which case
the price goes up to P. When Qt+1t ∈ Q− ≡ {{−1,−1−, 1}, {−1,−1, 1}, {−1,−1}},
negative information is revealed and the price drops to −P.
Moreover, define the set of orders that can occur along the equilibrium path as Q̂t+1t−1
and Q̂t+1t
(Qt+1t−1). The market maker’s price-setting strategy can then be written as
(A2) pt+1t =

(1 + r)pt+1t−1 if pt+1t−1 ∈
{−P2, P2} and Qt+1t ∈ Q̂t+1t ,
0 if pt+1t−1 = 0 and Qt+1t ∈ {{−1,1}, {1}, {−1}},
P if Qt+1t ∈ Q+, or Qt+1t /∈ Q̂t+1t and deviation x > 0,
−P if Qt+1t ∈ Q−, or Qt+1t /∈ Q̂t+1t and deviation x < 0.
The investor optimally trades again in asset t + 1 if her date-t − 1 signal was not
revealed in pt+1t−1. Since there is a positive probability that her date-t trade will again be
nonrevealing, she earns a strictly positive expected profit from doing so. The short-
term speculator also earns a strictly positive expected profit from buying (selling) one
unit after positive (negative) news. Again, let the market maker have the same off-the-
equilibrium-path belief as before, so that a deviation x > 0 (x < 0) results in a price
P (−P). This makes deviations from the equilibrium trading strategy unprofitable
for the same reason as before. Also, by the same argument as before, the investor
and the short-term speculator do not wish to trade if they have a zero signal, because
it would move the price in an unfavourable direction with positive probability.
Consider next date t equilibrium prices and orders following pt+1t−1 ∈ {−P2, P2},
i.e., the date-t − 1 order revealed the investor’s private information (or there was
an off-the-path order). In the proposed equilibrium, orders following P2 can be
{1,1, 1}, {−1, 1, 1}, {1, 1}, and {−1, 1}. The price is then set at pt+1t = P. Similarly,
after −P2, when orders can be {−1,−1,−1}, {1,−1,−1}, {−1,−1}, and {−1,1}, the
price is set at pt+1t = −P. Once again, one can apply the same off-the-path beliefs
and prices: Denote by x the deviation from the above equilibrium order. The market
maker then sets pt+1t = P if x > 0 and pt+1t = −P if x < 0. Since all information is
already revealed in the price, the investor and the short-term speculator make exactly
zero profits if they continue to trade. They are therefore indifferent between trading
and not, and for the equilibrium presented here it is assumed that they continue to
trade.
Note also that the equilibrium prices (on and off the path) do not allow for a profit-
increasing deviation for more complex intertemporal strategies. Any attempt to drive
down the price for asset t + 2 at t with a view to buying cheaply at t + 1 does not
work: If the date-t + 1 buy order is = 1, then the price will immediately jump to P.
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If it is 1, we need to distinguish three cases. Firstly, the date-t price was 0. In that
case the probability of getting the zero price at t + 1 is unaffected by the initial
trade, so it should be chosen independently. Secondly, the date-t price was negative
because of an off-the-path order at t. In that case a buy order of 1 is off the path
and will lead to a high price P. Finally, the date-t price was negative because of an
on-the-path order at that date. This could only have happened because the investor
submitted −1. This yields profits −P − pt+2t+1, which is negative according to Table 1.
The same is true for the converse strategy of driving the price up at t in order to sell
at a high price at t + 1. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To calculate trading profits from long-term information acquisition, note that with
probability (1/2) (1 − γtνl) the investor receives the signal st+2t = 0 and therefore
does not trade. With probability (1/4)(γtνl) the dividend payment is high and the
investor learns it. She submits a buy order, which is not revealed in order flow (i.e.,
Qt+2t = {−1, 1} and pt+2t = 0) with probability 1/2. The same is true for the low
dividend realization and the corresponding sell order. In all other states of the world
the investor makes a zero profit. This yields expected (discounted) trading profits
from the first-round trade of
1
4
γtνl · 12
(
1
(1 + r)2 − 0
)
+ 1
4
γtνl · 12 · (−1)
(
− 1
(1 + r)2 − 0
)
=
1
4γtνl
(1 + r)2 .
In the second period trade may be profitable if the first-round trade was not
revealed in order flow. This happens with probability (1/4)(γtνl). The second-round
trade only yields further profits if order flow Qt+2t+1 is also not revealing. This happens
when the short-term speculator receives the signal st+2t+1 = 0 (probability 1 − β)
and the noise trader submits an order in the opposite direction to the investor’s
(probability 1/2). The expected discounted profits from the second trading round
are therefore given by
1
4γtνl
(1 + r)2 ·
1 − β
2
.
Summing yields (4).
The investor makes a discounted trading profit of 1/(1 + r) when she acquires
short-term information and receives signal st+1t = 0 (probability (1/2)(γtνs)) and the
speculator does not submit an order (probability 1 − β) and the noise trader submits
an order in the opposite direction to the investor’s (probability 1/2). Otherwise the
investor’s order is revealed to the market maker and the price adjusts to the true
value of the asset, leaving no trading profit. This yields overall expected trading
profit of 1
1 + r ·
1
2
γtνs · (1 − β) · 12 .
Finally, in order to prove that profits are identical across all PBEs, we need to show
uniqueness outside the trivially different equilibria. Consider first the possibility of
equilibria in which an informed agent (investor or speculator) does not trade. At the
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above efficient prices pt+2t ({−1, 1}) = 0 and pt+2t+1({−1, 1}) = 0, an informed trader
makes a strictly positive expected profit from trade. Moreover, in any equilibrium,
price efficiency implies that a trader makes zero profits when his trade is revealed.
No trade can therefore be an equilibrium only if the price fully reveals the trader’s
information, even when order flow is not fully revealing. This is impossible given
the market maker’s information set.
Consider now the possibility of trade in the opposite direction to the stipulated
equilibrium: say an informed trader sells (buys) after receiving positive (negative)
news. In that case price efficiency requires pt+2t ({−1,−1}) = P2 (and similarly for
date-1 trades). This, however, provides an incentive to deviate to the informed trader,
because he would now make a strictly positive profit from selling after negative news
if the price under nonrevealing order flow is 0. The only way to deter this would be
to make the nonrevealing price negative. This, however, is only consistent with price
efficiency if the trader is more likely to trade (sell) on positive news. This cannot be
an equilibrium, because it would provide an incentive to buy after positive news. This
argument also generalizes to the case where mixed strategies are played. The price
would be pt+2t ({−1,−1}) > −P2, which provides the manager with an incentive to
deviate just as above. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Firstly, note that the profit-maximizing trading strategy also maximizes the investor’s
expected payoff, because the latter is strictly increasing in profits. Moreover, the
only long-run player is the investor. The market makers and short-term speculators
only play during the one or two periods before the dividend date for their asset. They
therefore choose their strategies so as to maximize expected profit (speculator) or
implement price efficiency (market maker), i.e., their objective functions are the
same as in the trading game of Proposition 1.
The effect of the investor’s trading strategy may be threefold. Firstly, it directly
affects the trading profits. Secondly, it may affect learning about the manager’s type,
and finally it may affect future actions by later generations of short-term speculators
and market makers. This last possibility has already been ruled out in the proof of
Proposition 1. In order to prove the lemma, I show that the choice of trading strategy
only has the first effect. From this it follows that the investor or manager chooses
the trading strategy so as to maximize expected discounted trading profits given
the signal realizations. All players therefore choose their strategies maximizing the
same payoff functions as in Proposition 1. Given that their information sets are also
unchanged, this implies that the set of equilibrium strategies must coincide.
Consider first how the investor’s trading strategy affects learning about his type.
The investor learns about the manager’s type by comparing his signal realization
with later realized dividends and prices. Under short-term information acquisition at
date t, the investor updates her belief based on the observation of st+1t and dt+1. The
trading strategy therefore has no effect on learning. Under long-term information
acquisition at date t, a performance observation at t + 1 consists of (st+2t , pt+2t+1).
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When st+2t ∈ {−1,1}, the investor knows that the manager is a high type, and learning
stops. Again, the trading strategy is irrelevant in that case. When st+2t = 0, the future
price may move up to P or down to −P, revealing that the manager could have
received but failed to receive a signal. Since the price is only a noisy signal for the
short-term speculator’s information, the investor could learn more by inducing the
short-term speculator to reveal his signal st+2t+1 directly. Since side payments are ruled
out, the only way for the investor to achieve this would be to induce the speculator
to trade so as to reveal his order to the market maker. This can be achieved if it is
possible to compensate the speculator for the forgone trading profits by leaving him
with higher trading profits in other states of the world. The only way for the investor
to do that is by refraining from trading at date t when the manager has received
a signal st+2t = −1 or 1. In that case, however, the investor no longer needs to learn
about the manager’s ability, and therefore she would prefer to trade on such a signal.
This strategy is therefore not time-consistent. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The following performance observations at t + 1 following ht = 1 in state (γ0,∅)
are possible.
(i) If dt+1 ∈ {−1,1}, then with probability γ̂tνs the manager observes a high signal
st+1t = dt+1. Since only high types may get this signal, the posterior probability that
the manager is a high type is equal to one:
γt+1(γ̂t, dt+1 ∈ {−1, 1}, st+1t = dt+1) = 1.
The investor therefore switches to long-term information acquisition in the subse-
quent period and receives a present value of V(1) (see Remark 1). This case occurs
with probability (1/2)(γ̂tνs).
(ii) If dt+1 ∈ {−1,1}, the manager receives a signal st+1t = 0 with probability
1 − γ̂tνs. In this case the posterior can be calculated from Bayesian updating as
γt+1(γ̂t, dt+1 ∈ {−1, 1}, st+1t = 0) =
γ̂t (1 − νs)
1 − γ̂tνs ,(A2)
which is smaller than γ̂t . If γ̂t = γ0 the manager’s reputation drops to below γ0. It
is then clearly optimal to fire the manager and hire a new one, who then acquires
short-term information by assumption. The investor receives continuation payoff
Vs(γ0, 0).
(iii) Finally, if dt+1 = 0 (probability 1/2), the high- and the low-type manager
receive st+1t = 0. This yields
γt+1(γ̂t, dt+1 = 0, st+1t = 0) = γ̂t,
and the investor does not learn anything about the manager’s type. When γ̂t = γ0
the investor receives Vs(γ0,∅).
Hence, we can write
Vs(γ0,∅) = E[π (γ0, 1)] + 11 + r
[
1
2
γ0νsV(1) +
(
1 − 1
2
γ0νs
)
Vs(γ0,∅)
]
.(A3)
Alexander Gümbel450 JITE 161
Solving (A3) yields (14). Note that there is a one-to-one relationship between the
performance observations and the reputation updates. This allows us to formulate
the optimal policy directly as a function of the performance observations, as is done
in (13). Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose a newly employed manager acquired long-term information at t − 1.
If he receives a nonzero signal, the investor updates her belief about his abil-
ity to 1. By the assumption (6) it is then optimal for him to acquire long-term
information forever in the future. If the manager receives the signal st+1t−1 = 0,
his reputation falls to γt
(
st+1t−1 = 0
) = [γ0 (1 − νl)]/[1 − γ0νl]. Moreover, the in-
vestor updates her belief that dt+1 = 0 to (1 − γ0νl)/(2 − γ0νl) < 1/2. If the investor
asks the manager to acquire short-term information at t, this yields an expected
payoff of
Vs
(
γt
(
qt+1t−1 = 0
)
, {0}) = 1 − γ0νl
2 − γ0νl
γ0(1−νl)
1−γ0νl νs
( 1−β
2 + V (1)
)
1 + r
+ 1 − γ0νl
2 − γ0νl
(
1 − γ0(1−νl)1−γ0νl νs
)
1 + r V (γ0,∅)
+ 1
2 − γ0νl
V (γ0,∅)
1 + r .
Instead of retaining the manager and letting him acquire short-term information,
the investor could have hired a new manager and let him acquire long-term infor-
mation. The payoff from doing so would be Vl (γ0,∅). If short-term information
acquisition is optimal at t, we must have Vs
(
γt
(
st+1t−1 = 0
)
, {0}) > Vl (γ0,∅). More-
over, if it was optimal to choose long-term information acquisition initially, we
know that Vl (γ0,∅) > Vs (γ0,∅). Hence, we would have Vs
(
γt
(
st+1t−1 = 0
)
, {0}) >
Vs (γ0,∅). Using (A3), it is straightforward to show that this leads to a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose a manager of reputation γ̂t acquires the long-term signal for the first time
(It = ∅). Three performance observations are possible.
(i) The dividend payment is dt+2 ∈ {−1, 1}, and the manager receives st+2t = dt+2.
The investor then updates her belief about the manager to γt+1 = 1, retains the
manager, and lets him acquire long-term information in the subsequent period (see
Remark 1).
(ii) The manager receives a zero signal st+2t = 0, but the subsequent price indi-
cates that the dividend payment is nonzero: st+2t = 0, pt+2t+1 ∈ {−P, P} . This occurs
when the dividend payment is nonzero (probability 1/2), the manager does not
learn this (probability 1 − γ̂tνl), the short-term speculator receives signal st+2t+1 = dt+2
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(probability β), and his order is revealed to the market maker (probability 1/2).
The investor therefore knows that dt+2 = 0, and his Bayesian update about man-
agerial ability will not change at t + 2. The reputation at t + 1 changes to γt+1 =
[γ̂t (1 − νl)]/[1 − γ̂tνl], and it is a sufficient statistic for the manager’s performance
history. We can therefore set It+1 = ∅. Moreover, since [γ̂t (1 − νl)]/[1 − γ̂tνl] < γ̂t
and the investor does not benefit from waiting to observe dt+2, it is clearly opti-
mal to fire a manager who started with reputation γ̂t = γ0 after this performance
observation.
(iii) The manager receives a zero signal and the subsequent price stays at zero(
qt+2t = 0, pt+2t+1 = 0
)
. This can happen because the future dividend payment is zero
(probability 1/2), or because the dividend payment is nonzero and the manager
received a signal st+2t = 0 [probability (1/2) (1 − γ̂tνl)], and order flow is not reveal-
ing, either because the short-term speculator also did not trade (probability 1 − β),
or because his order was not revealed (probability β/2). The manager’s reputation
then drops to
γ−t+1 =
γ̂t
[
1 + (1 − νl)
(
1 − β2
)]
1 + ηt ,
where ηt ≡ [1 − γ̂tνl][1 − (β/2)].
Note that a manager who started with reputation γ̂t = γ0 now has a reputation
γ−t+1 < γ0. An investor can improve the expected ability of the manager employed
by hiring a new one. On the other hand, when the manager is retained, the memory
for the past trade is activated (It+1 = {0}). From Lemma 2 we know that he will
acquire long-term information again in the next period. Note that the investor learns
about the manager from the date-t + 1 information acquisition in the same way,
independently of whether the incumbent or a new manager acquires information.
Hence, the rate of learning differs only due to the date-t information acquisition that
a new manager does not have. The highest reputation that observing (st+2t = 0, dt+2)
can generate occurs when the investor learns that the manager’s zero signal at
date t was in fact optimal, because dt+2 = 0. This yields an updated reputation
γt+2(γ̂t, dt+2 = 0, st+2t = 0) = γ̂t . Since we started with γ̂t = γ0, the investor can
therefore do no worse by picking a manager from the pool immediately instead of
waiting for a period. It follows that it is optimal to fire the incumbent manager after(
st+2t = 0, pt+2t+1 = 0
)
.
Hence, a newly employed manager is only retained when he receives a nonzero
signal and is thus identified as a high type. This happens with probability (1/2)(γ0νl)
and yields future expected payoffs of V(1). In all other states the manager is fired,
yielding payoff Vl(γ0,∅).
We can then write
Vl(γ0,∅) = E[π (γ0, 2)] + 11 + r
[
1
2
γ0νl V(1) +
(
1 − 1
2
γ0νl
)
V(γ0,∅)
]
.(A4)
Solving (A4) yields (17). Q.E.D.
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